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Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation  





Russia’s economy is energy intense and wasteful of resources. This situation has arisen in 
part due to the country’s ample energy supplies and regulated privileges for domestic con-
sumers. Recently enacted and proposed reforms intended to increase the efficiency of the 
energy sector by raising domestic energy prices also have implications for the export levels 
of Russian energy commodities. In this study, we estimate the costs of the subsidised en-
ergy system in an allocative sense and then analyse recent moves of the Duma to boost gas 
and electricity prices to bring them into line with market-based pricing. Our analysis uses a 
multi-region general equilibrium model (GTAP) modified to express the global dimensions 
of the subsidisation policy and suggested reforms. Preliminary results show that current 
subsidies extract over 6% of GDP and limit the potential benefits of Russia’s comparative 
advantage in energy commodities. Increases of 6% in electricity and 10% in the price of 
regulated gas improve efficiency by reducing distorting subsidies and distinctly shifting 
output from domestic markets to exports. 
 
Keywords: CGE modelling, energy market liberalisation, Russia  
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Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation  





Venäjän suuret energiavarannot ja kotimaisen kulutuksen säädellyt edut ovat tehneet maas-
ta energiaintensiivisen talouden, joka tuhlaa resurssejaan. Viimeaikaiset ehdotukset ener-
giasektorin tehostamiseksi vaikuttavat energian kotimaiseen hintaan ja sitä kautta myös 
Venäjän energiahyödykkeiden vientiin. Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan aluksi tuetun ener-
giajärjestelmän kustannuksia tehokkaan allokaation näkökulmasta. Sen jälkeen analysoi-
daan ensimmäisiä toimia, jotka Duuma on hyväksynyt kaasun ja sähkön hinnan nostami-
seksi lähemmäksi markkinaehtoista hinnoittelua. Analyysi on toteutettu usean alueen ylei-
sen tasapainon mallilla (GTAP), joka tuo esiin tukipolitiikan ja ehdotettujen uudistusten 
globaalit vaikutukset. Alustavat tulokset osoittavat nykyisten tukien vievän yli 6 prosenttia 
BKT:sta jättäen Venäjän suhteellisen edun energiahyödykkeissä osittain hyödyntämättä. 
Säännöstellyn sähkön hinnan 6 prosentin ja kaasun hinnan 10 prosentin korotukset paran-
tavat tehokkuutta vähentämällä vääristäviä tukia ja siirtäen tuotantoa selvästi kotimaisilta 
markkinoilta vientiin. 
 
Asiasanat: Venäjä, energia, YTP-mallit 
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1  Introduction 
Extensive energy resources in the absence of a functioning domestic market for energy 
products allowed the centrally planned Soviet Union to become an energy-intensive econ-
omy with excessive crude oil production and inefficient conversion of energy to secondary 
markets in power production. The lack of a price mechanism and state ownership of re-
sources also allowed consumers and enterprises to exploit the country’s energy resources at 
prices far below those prevailing in market economies. Since the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, the energy-intensity of the Russian economy has continued to exceed the OECD aver-
age, while rates charged for fuel and electrical power remain below long-term supply costs 
and well below the levels in Western Europe and North America.
2 This price structure is 
further distorted by the system of cross-subsidies from industry and business to residential 
customers found in all CIS countries (Kennedy 2003). 
In April 2003, the Russian government approved a long-term energy strategy that 
seeks to increase energy production and promote efficient energy use in Russia (BOFIT 
2003a, No. 22). Greater energy efficiency will surely make Russia’s economy less energy 
intense and free up greater volumes of crude oil, gas and other energy products for export. 
Moreover, increasing energy exports are a channel for acceding to global commodity mar-
kets. On the other hand, a further boosting of exports of energy products will further nar-
row Russia’s export mix and could even threaten stable development to the extent that it 
increases budgetary dependence on trends in world energy prices. For the government, 
budget income from these resource rents is so vital that it well justifies the aims to increase 
production and exports.  
 Price liberalisation in energy markets, especially power production, is crucial for the 
market mechanism to function and generate the revenue needed for necessary investment 
in the sector. The domestic price of gas is currently a quarter of the world market price and 
the price of oil on the domestic market is a third of the international price.
3 The cross-
subsidisation of residential power effectively raises rates charged to firms to about 1.8 
times the rate charged for residential electricity and heat (EBRD 2001). Higher prices from 
domestic energy use are needed for sustainable business and for decreasing the energy-
intensity of the economy. Efficient production frees resources for other uses and increases 
the costs of the energy use before the structural changes occur. Such changes, while im-
proving the overall allocation of resources, would inevitably create winners and losers in 
the short run. This situation largely explains the lack of political enthusiasm for imple-
menting such changes. 
In this paper, we analyse currently planned reforms Russia’s energy markets, focusing 
on their potential efficiency in resource allocation. Numerical simulations support the 
analyses, which are performed with a global database and a multi-region general equilib-
rium model (GTAP) provided with compatible data. In version 5.4, the most recently pub-
lished version of the GTAP database,
4 Russia is separated as a country of its own with a 
national input-output model. Bilateral trade flows with the rest of the world genuinely con-
                                                 
2 For an overview of energy markets, see IEA 2003. 
3 Information on the export price of natural gas and the relative oil prices in domestic and international mar-
kets comes from Russian economic trends, version 2002. The domestic price of natural gas in 2003 was 
about $23 per thousand cubic meters; the average price of exported gas in the last three years was about $98 
per thousand cubic meters. 
4 http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap. Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





nect Russia to global trade flows. The database includes information on energy taxes, 
which we modify to include implicit subsidies for regulated prices. We further attempt to 
survey the current tax, subsidy and market structures in the Russian energy sector.  
The goals of this paper are twofold. First, we analyse the extent of Russian energy 
markets, especially the costs resulting from the current distortions in the tax and subsidy 
system. The analysis is performed by totally removing all taxes and subsidies in the Rus-
sian energy sector. The simulations produce results on aggregate-level effects and changes 
in the production and trading patterns. With somewhat realistic reforms currently on the 
agenda, we focus on what might happen with increases in regulated electricity and gas 
rates. Simulation results show that current taxes and subsidies exhaust over 6% of current 
resources and that this gap is mainly the outcome of subsidised gas prices for households 
and industry. In the price liberalisation reform, we focus on the trade-off between domestic 
and international markets required by the reform. We study the effect on global trade flows 
in gas, electricity and manufacturing industries that are sensitive to energy prices. We also 
consider the impact of such changes on Russia’s closest trading partners. 
In the section 2 of this paper, we show the importance of Russian energy markets for 
the domestic economy and for global energy markets. Section 3 provides an overview of 
the policy landscape for energy markets and what such policy implies in the domestic field 
and in global trade negotiations. Section 4 presents the model and simulations. In section 5, 
we analyse the costs of the distorted energy system, while in section 6 we examine the im-




2  The role of Russian energy in trade  
  and the domestic economy 
For the purposes of this study, we make following restrictions on our analysis of energy 
sector: we focus solely on Russia;
5 and we only consider primary energy production of oil 
and natural gas (coal, while treated as a separate sector, is not of primary interest for this 
discussion). Our database also treats the distribution of gas as a distinct sector. Gazprom’s 
monopoly on ownership and governance of pipelines should justify the distribution of gas 
as a separate industry. However, as all sectors behave symmetrically, monopoly power is 
unapparent in the sector. Our data do not make it possible to study separately the market 
structure in Russian oil markets, where extraction is partly privatised, while pipelines are 
operated by a state-owned company. Regarding secondary energy markets, we treat elec-
tricity and heat as a single sector and analyse their subsidies and price reform. The tech-
nology of the energy sector is inferred from the input-output data for Russia and the pro-
duction technology is mainly a nested CES function.
6 In any case, we focus here on de-
mand-based reactions to changes in relative prices, rather than technology choices in pro-
duction. Our definition of the GDP produced by the energy sector includes the fuel indus-
try (the first six industries listed in Table 2.1.) 
The size of the energy sector can be measured either as the value added produced by 
the sector as a share of total GDP or as the sectors’ output compared to total output. We 
                                                 
5 For a general overview of other CIS countries, see e.g. EBRD (2001). 
6  GTAP Database 5.4. For a description of the GTAP model, see Hertel and Tsigas (1997). BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





take the EU for comparison in Table 2.1. Measured in terms of value added, the share of 
energy sector from GDP in Russia is 15.9% compared to the EU’s 1.7%. Measured in rela-
tion to total production, the share of energy sector in Russia is 19.7%, a share ten times 
larger than for the EU. The figures are modified from the original GTAP database to in-
clude subsidies for consumers in electricity and for firms and consumers in gas industries.
7 
Our corrected figures deviate somewhat from Wehrheim (2003), who reports the respective 
shares based on World Bank (1995) figures as 13.0% and 11.6%. Our figures are quite in 
line with Tabata (2002), who estimates the oil and gas industry produces 16.1% from GDP 




Russia is the world’s second largest producer and exporter of crude oil after Saudi Arabia. 
In natural gas, it is the world’s leading producer and exporter. Russia even exports over 7% 
of total world exports of petroleum products (IEA 2003). For the EU, the importance of 
Russia is huge. Of total imports of oil and gas to the EU, 10% and 43%, respectively, come 
from Russia (GTAP). 
Russia’s comparative advantage in natural resources can be seen in its trading patterns. 
Crude oil constitutes 15% of Russian exports, natural gas 17%, oil products 8%, and other 
minerals and extracted materials such as aluminium and nickel about 25%. The energy sec-
tor’s share of total exports is 43.4% (GTAP 2003). As the price of oil is volatile and 
greatly affects the world market prices of other commodities (including gas), Russia’s 
economy, as noted above, remains highly vulnerable to external shocks and attempts to 
diversify Russia’s production structure should be generally welcomed. Throughout our 
analysis, we only treat taxes and subsidies in the energy sector as distortionary tools that 
                                                 
7 For the same data in the original GTAP data, see Appendix 2. 
8 According to Tabata (2002), the share of GDP produced by the oil and gas industry varied between 15.8% 
and 24.3% during the period 1995-2000. Some estimation errors may result from domestic margins and 
whether they are included in the energy sector or trade and transport sectors. 
 
Table 2.1 Sectoral composition of GDP in the Russian Federation and EU
Value Added Total Production
Russia EU Russia EU
1 Electricity 0.5 1.1 4.1 1.3
2 Oil 6.3 0.2 5.9 0.2
3 Gas 9.1 0.1 6.4 0.1
4 Gas Distribution 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.1
5 Fuel Industry 0.3 0.1 3.3 0.7
6 Raw metals and coal 5 . 7 2 . 373 . 7
7 Chemicals 1.6 3.1 2.4 5
8 Mechanical industry, automobiles 4.2 7.5 5.2 10.8
9 Wood industries 1.4 2.6 1.7 3.4
10 Light manufacturing 2.1 4.3 2.4 6
11 Construction 8.5 5.7 7.9 6.7
12 Food industries 3 . 5 3 . 365 . 4
13 Agriculture 8.9 2.1 8.9 2
14 Trade and transport 14.5 18.3 13 16.6
15 Services 32.2 49.1 25 38.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100 100
Energy intensity 17.3 1.7 20.5 2.4
Source: GTAP Database 5.4. For 1997 and author's calculationsLeena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





decrease the efficiency of the economy as a traditional dead-weight loss. The role of taxes 
as corrective policy devices in the case of externalities or limiting the use of non-renewable 
resources is beyond this approach. We also abstract from the budget revenue dimension of 
taxes or the fact that indirect subsidies in the form of regulated prices are not actually part 
of the government budget.
9 International best practice dictates that multiple fiscal instru-
ments should be employed in ways that keep distortion to a minimum as risks and returns 
change over time (EBRD 2001). For example, Russia’s hydrocarbon tax structure (EBRD 
2001) includes royalties based on volume recovered varying from 6% to 16%, a 25% cor-
porate profits tax, an excise tax based on volumes (66 roubles per metric tonne of oil, 30% 
for non-CIS gas exports), a 10% mineral depletion tax and a crude oil export tariff (€20 per 
tonne of oil). The export tariff varies with prevailing oil prices.  
GTAP Database 5.4 provides the following tax and subsidy structure for the energy 
products in the database (Table 2.2). Positive figures are taxes; negative figures are subsi-
dies. All positive figures come from GTAP Database 5.4. We have modified the subsidy 
structure so that the data more accurately describe the structure of energy markets in Rus-
sia. In the simulations below, we refer to these tax figures and describe how we base the 
subsidies on information on real, regulated prices. Taxes in the GTAP database are based 




A dominant feature is the low price of gas and oil in Russia’s domestic market. As men-
tioned, the domestic price of gas is about a quarter of the world market price and the price 
of oil at domestic markets is a third of the international price. The domestic price of gas in 
2003 was about $23 per thousand cubic meters. The average export price over the period 
2000-2002 was about $98 per thousand cubic meters (Russian Economic Trends 2002). 
The regulated gas price, which is well below actual cost as well as the prevailing world 
market price, constitutes a clear subsidy to all users of gas for power production or heating. 
Payment arrears, barter arrangements and non-payments in the energy sector further act to 
subsidise the energy markets. As estimating the real subsidy rate in the presence of other 
distortions is a non-trivial task, we begin our approach with rough estimates.
10  
The subsidy for consumers and firms for domestic gas is expressed as a 75% subsidy. 
This is inferred from a fact that currently firms and consumers pay about a quarter of the 
market value of gas. This assumption applies to both gas and gas distribution. Altertax 
software makes it possible to modify the data in this respect without altering the initial fac-
tor market shares between sectors. We also correct for the consumer subsidy in the elec-
                                                 
9 The costs of these subsidies are largely borne by Russian energy-producing firms, which in turn have the 
possibility to operate with costs exceeding actual revenue. Treating the subsidies described here as a tax to 
the primary producer of gas or electricity offers provides possibilities to continue the work started here. 
10 Problems associated with Russian energy tax rates are acknowledged by those compiling the GTAP data-
base (McDougall 2003). 
Table 2.2 Ad valorem tax rates and subsidies on Russian Energy Commodities
  Output tax Export tax Import duty  Consumer subsidy Firm subsidy (average)
1 Coal 2.0 2.8 0-5.0 5.2 2.7
2 Oil 22.9 10.0 0-5.0 0.0 2.4
3 Gas 16.1 9.6 0-5.0 -75.0 -75.0
4 Gas Distribution 16.1 4.9 0-5.0 -75.0 -75.0
5 Electricity 2.8 7.4 0-5.0 -56.0 0.2
6 Fuel Industry 2.1 9.5 0-5.0 17.6 4.3
Source: GTAP 5.4. Database, EBRD (2001) and other sourcesBOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





tricity market. Electricity markets are highly regional and there is no clear international 
reference for electricity rates. Russia’s electricity markets have the unusual feature that 
residential rates for power are lower than industrial rates. According to the EBRD (2001), 
the ratio of industrial rates to residential rates for Russia in 2000 was 1.8. This is a form of 
cross-subsidisation of consumers at the expense of firms. If we treat the industrial rate in 
the electricity market as a market price, the lower residential rate implies a 56% subsidy to 
residential consumers. 
Although the domestic price of oil is well below the world market price, inferences on 
subsidies are not analogous for the gas market. Instead, the inadequate export capacity and 
the government’s willingness to restrict exports of oil have led to an over-supply and low 




3  Elements of energy market reform in Russia 
Several factors suggest pressures on Russian energy markets to alter the shape of markets 
and price formation, but no single factor is so overriding as to assure such changes will ac-
tually happen. For this purpose, we list the main features of the reforms and explain some 
of the positions put forward by actors in the market. 
The Russian government’s most concrete signal of a desire for change was the long-
term energy strategy announced in April 2003. The main goals of the strategy are to in-
crease energy production and promote efficient energy use in Russia (BOFIT 2003a, No. 
22), and thereby make the economy less energy intense and free up additional crude oil, 




3.1  Price liberalisation 
Energy market reform and enhanced market competitiveness typically require a move from 
subsidised prices for gas and electricity to freely determined prices. Russian domestic 
prices of gas and electricity are administratively governed and the Duma must authorise 
any rate hikes. The domestic oil market is regulated by export restrictions and pipeline 
controls. 
Figure 3.1 sketches a dual-track partial price liberalisation resulting from domestic 
subsidised energy commodity prices.
11 The world price is given as exogenous to the econ-
omy. The export level in a partial equilibrium framework is the difference between supply 
and demand with a price level p
w. In regulated domestic markets, the price set by the 
government is p
d. At that price, there is excess demand for the commodity and we assume 
the government will impose regulations for firms to fulfil this demand, even though the 
firms are making losses (shaded area under the supply curve). The supply curve also 
measures the marginal costs of production. With the regulated domestic price, the amount 
                                                 
11 “Dual track” refers to a partial price liberalisation in the market where part of the market behaves competi-
tively and part of the market is regulated to guarantee the domestic supply. The analysis here is a modified 
and simplified analysis of Roland (2000) where the dual-track price liberalisation refers especially to China’s 
experiences in agricultural markets. Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





the marginal costs of production. With the regulated domestic price, the amount available 
for exports reduces to Q
w  – Q
d, where Q
w is the firms’ willingness to produce at price p
w 
and Q
d is the domestic demand at price p
d. In a centrally planned economy, the profits from 




Figure 3.1. Dual-track partial price liberalisation in energy markets. 
The rise in the domestic price in Figure 3.1 can be analysed by increasing p
d. Such an in-
crease reduces domestic demand, increases export supply and decreases subsidies. The 
draft 2004 budget foresaw a 20% rise in the price of natural gas and a 16% rise in the price 
of electricity (BOFIT 2003b, No. 7-9). While the actual increases depend upon inflation, 
the budget act clearly seeks to raise the relative prices of energy commodities. Roughly 
estimating an inflation rate of 10%, results in 10% and 6% real increases in the relative 
prices of gas and electricity. 
The pressures to increase domestic prices stem partly from domestic forces when firms 
strive to become more competitive. Reforms are also part of Russia’s efforts to create a 
market economy. The EU has perhaps been the loudest foreign proponent of increasing 
Russian energy prices (see below). Such reforms will clearly affect consumers, the gov-
ernment revenue and international markets (not only in energy goods but also in manufac-
turing goods that use energy as an input).  
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3.2  Tax reform 
Price increases are assumed to be transmitted through tax reforms to the energy sector. 
Tariffs on the production and export of oil and natural gas presently constitute about 35% 
of total federal budget revenues, which means that the budget is highly sensitive to fluctua-
tions in world market prices for energy (BOFIT 2003b, No. 9). In spring 2003, the Duma 
introduced several tax reforms affecting the energy sector. These included an increase in 
the oil extraction tax and introduction of a natural gas extraction tax. Another proposal 
would eliminate the excise tax on natural gas, while raising the export tax on gas to 20% 
(BOFIT 2003a, No. 26). 
Shifting the tax burden towards energy commodities is partly a response to the lower-
ing of the value-added tax (VAT). In general, the government has attempted to boost its tax 
take on oil income, and, in particular, windfall profits of Russian producers from high in-
ternational oil prices. Extraction of natural resources from easy-access, high-profit fields 





3.3  Design of market structure  
To ensure restructuring to more efficient production after price liberalisation so that price 
increases do not end up in rents of monopolies, supporting reforms are also expected to 
ensure competitive behaviour among firms. The main features of such reforms concern the 
design of the market structure and a gradual abortion of regulated prices for domestic en-
ergy commodities. 
Increased competition in energy markets, especially in electricity and gas production, 
is a main component in the reform plan. For gas production, however, the reform faces se-
vere opposition from Gazprom, which is unwilling to share its pipelines with other compa-
nies. As a result, no plan for the reform in gas sector is likely to be implemented in the near 
future. 
The reform plan for UES, the national electricity monopoly, strives to break up the 
company into ten privately independent regional power generating companies serving the 
wholesale market. In addition, several regional power-generating companies will be sepa-
rated from UES. The power grid would remain state-owned, while five regional power 
transmission companies would be partly state-owned (BOFIT 2003a, No. 23). 
The plans are in concord with liberalisation schemes in the OECD and the EU. Eco-
nomic theory says that when a natural monopoly exploits decreasing average costs is only 
useful to split it up in those areas that do not benefit from increasing returns to scale. For 
many monopolies, there are several areas that exhibit constant returns to scale. For Rus-
sia’s gas monopoly, for example, the pipelines may hold properties of natural monopoly. 
For electricity production, improvements in the competitive environment usually requires 
splitting up the ownership of power generation and the ownership of the grid, and this is 
also suggested in Russia’s case. 
The energy reform includes plans for increasing the extraction of oil for exports and 
building up new infrastructure for this purpose. The energy intensity of the economy and 
consumption of energy commodities would decrease.  Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





3.4  Global interest for Russian energy reform  
The global interest in reforms in Russian energy sector stems partly from the general inter-
est on how Russia moves from centrally planned economy to competitively working mar-
kets and integration with global markets. Russia’s reform measures in electricity and gas 
supply have much in common with those of OECD countries, and especially EU countries. 
The convergence in market design can be seen (IEA 2002).  
The EU has been highly vocal on Russia’s highly subsidised energy prices. The topic 
has been on the agenda at the ongoing WTO negotiations for Russia, as well as in bilateral 
negotiations between Russia and the EU. Because Europe depends on Russian energy, and 
will be even more dependent on Russian gas in the future, the EU insists that Russia’s do-
mestic prices for energy resources must approach world prices and that Russia’s energy 
sector requires significant reform. Russia’s view has been that lower energy prices are due 
to its comparative advantage. Raising the domestic price of energy to world-market levels 
would also make Russian manufacturing uncompetitive. 
Critics earlier noted that Russia’s subsidised gas and electricity prices conferred sig-
nificant competitive advantage on its domestic industries. This, in turn, raised the threat of 
retaliation with antidumping and other countervailing measures against Russian exports. 
With Russia’s pending WTO membership and acceptance as a market economy, Russia 
should gain more rights against antidumping penalties. Although energy reform should not 
remain a crucial question after Russia’s accession to the WTO, the energy reform must still 
be considered from the standpoint of global economic integration. 
The speed of reforms is interesting both from the standpoint of national effects and in 
terms of how the reforms effect export supply and thus the export price and quantity of gas 
and oil. Market conditions also form the basis for infrastructure investments in Russia, 
which impact, in turn, e.g. environmental protection measures and the investment climate 
in general. Russia’s successful development is very much dependent on the development 
of its energy sector. 
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4  Model framework 
We now analyse the distortions in Russian energy markets and proposed price liberalisa-
tion with the help of a multi-region general equilibrium model and a database supported by 
the model.
12 In recent years, such models have become standard in evaluating trade policy-
related issues.
13 GTAP Database 5.4 includes an improved input-output table for Russia 
that allows study of Russian issues in a global context. We aggregate the 78 regions and 57 
sectors into 15 commodities (see Table 2.1 above) and seven country groups (Appendix 
1b). In the regional aggregation, we focus on Russia, the EU and former Soviet Union 
countries (Baltic States and other CIS countries). The rest of the regions are Central and 
Eastern European countries (EEA), Northern America (NAM) and the Rest of the World 
(ROW). The GTAP database includes input-output tables expressed in dollar value terms 
for all countries in the data. 
Several single-country CGE models have recently been built for Russia (e.g. Alekseev 
2003, Wehrheim 2003). While under the GTAP framework single-country data can be used 
to derive a single-country model (CRUSOE),
14 our goal here is to analyse Russia in the 
global context. While Russia is generally a minor player globally, its main export products 
are important in global trade and domestic measures affecting the energy sector are likely 
to have global implications. 
Studies to date on the Russian economy in the CGE framework typically relate to 
WTO membership or EU integration (Sulamaa and Widgren 2003, Alekseev 2003, Lejour 
2001). Wehrheim (2003) also tackles changes in agricultural production.  
“Former Soviet Union” was an aggregate in the previous GTAP database and its syn-
thetic input-output table was unrepresentative of Russia or any other FSU country. Riip-
inen (2003) analyses energy market liberalisation with the previous GTAP database using 
GTAP data as the only source for information on Russian energy market which for the 
above-mentioned reasons gives a wrong description relative to the real distortions. 
Clements, Jung and Gupta (2003) study the effects of petroleum price liberalisation in 
Indonesia with a CGE model. They find that increasing prices of petroleum products by 
25% reduces the output in petroleum-using sectors and depresses household consumption. 
Consumption decreases more sharply than production and the utilities sector is most sig-




4.1  Main features of the GTAP model 
The standard GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997) assumes a competitive environment, 
where firms and households take prices as given. On the demand side, the regional house-
hold consists of a representative consumer, who devotes a constant share of his income to 
public expenditures, consumes tradable commodities and saves part of his income. The 
                                                 
12 Information on GTAP Project, the database and the model, as well as several applications are posted on the 
project’s website at http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap. Hertel and Tsigas (1997) describe the model. Dima-
ranan and McDougall et al. (2002) describe GTAP Database version 5. 
13 See Francois and Reinert (1997) for a survey on the use of numerical models for evaluating trade policy. 
14 Software available at the GEMPACK website http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm.  Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





production structure of the economy is based on input-output structure where imported or 
domestic intermediates are used for production of commodities. The nested production 
structure defines the behaviour of firms that minimise their costs and adapt their factor de-
mand to changes in relative prices. Functional forms in the production structure define sub-
stitution possibilities for source countries for imports, as well as substitution between do-
mestic and imported commodities and between intermediate and value-added products. 
Behavioural changes are based on current production and trading patterns and largely rest 
on the original data for 1997 in the current database. The magnitude of the responsive reac-
tions is affected by behavioural parameters provided by the database. 
Armington elasticities are included in the behavioural parameters that define the de-
mand response to changes in relative prices of domestic against imported commodities. 
Small elasticities would imply large market power, even for small countries. We have in-
creased the original elasticities for energy commodities in order to present a more realistic 
description of the homogenous nature of energy goods. 
The macroeconomic components of the model balance global savings to global in-
vestments. These savings are the outcome of the behaviour of the representative consum-
ers. Investments are financed from the global savings pool based on their relative yield. 
The current account not need be balanced. 
Although the GTAP model includes is a detailed description of taxes, it does not con-
sider the public sector as a separate agent. It is possible, however, to control the tax burden 
of the economy by changing certain variables from exogenous to endogenous, i.e. to mod-
ify the closure of the model. Usually the tax burden is an endogenous variable in the 
model. By keeping it fixed and letting the general consumer tax adapt, it is possible to 
make a scenario where extra tax revenue or savings from decreased subsidies are allocated 
back to consumers by increasing their welfare. We study this case below. In many other 
cases, GTAP model closures offer a large variety of possibilities to fix certain elements in 
the economy and let other variables adapt. We further modify the standard closure of the 
model by fixing the prices of energy commodities. 
The policy instruments of the model and data have been implemented by price wedges 
between different levels of prices. For example, the price wedge between the value of 
world market prices and market prices that domestic consumers and firms face is the power 
of tariffs in the economy. Similar wedges apply to prices between domestic producers 
(agents) and users. Russia’s energy sector features a price wedge between world market 
price and the price that oil and gas producing firms get for their products. This price wedge 
is described by both the output tax and the export tax. Any outcome of the model, e.g. an 
increase in GDP, is the result of an improved allocation of resources and relative price of 




4.2  Opening the black box – interpretation of the simulation results 
Large general equilibrium models include thousands of equations that simultaneously de-
termine the model outcome and the solutions to an experiment. In general equilibrium, all 
agents adapt their behaviour to external conditions. Thus, the solutions cannot be con-
cluded on the basis of single equations. In general, the model outcome is dependent on the 
model, the data and the parameters that define the magnitude of responsive reactions. De-BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





pending on the application and the shock, different components have different emphasis. In 
many cases, results seem to appear from a “black box.” 
GEMPACK software includes several support programs to decompose and put in 
pieces the results of the model. This software is standard part of the GTAP model as well. 
In this study, we use the following add-on components for analysing the results: 
 
Welfare decomposition 
One model result is the money metric change for the increase in global welfare. Under the 
method developed for the GTAP framework by Huff and Hertel (2000), global welfare 
change can be decomposed to changes by regions. We ask how much of the welfare in-
crease can be attributed to regions or commodities. The region-specific changes can further 
be decomposed to changes in allocative efficiency and terms-of-trade effects. The first 
arise from a decrease or increase in dead-weight losses within the economy and the latter 
from the relative prices between exportable and importable commodities.  The other ag-
gregate-scale effects to the regional welfare arise from the global investment module and 
the contribution of productivity effects when they are given as shocks to the model. We use 
the method below in analysing the aggregate effects of current distortions (Figure 5.3). 
 
Decomposing simulations in respect to exogenous shocks 
The results of policy simulations represent the compound of several exogenous shocks. In 
our application of the total removal of all taxes and subsidies they include shocks to output 
taxes, import duties, export taxes and subsidies, by commodities. To evaluate the relative 
significance of these different shocks is not a trivial question. In a general form, the rela-
tionship between the endogenous variable Z and the exogenous variables X1, X2, …,Xn is  
 
Z = F(X1, X2, …,Xn).    (1) 
The change in Z relative to the exogenous shocks X I is represented by  
 
dZ = F1dX1 + F2dX2 + --- + FndXn, where Fi = ∂F/∂Xi. (2) 
The magnitude of different partial derivatives is not general as different partial derivatives 
are evaluated around the reference point (the solution). Harrison et al. (2000) demonstrate 
how GEMPACK software can decompose the effects of several variables into their com-
ponent parts in general situations. In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below, we decompose the GDP 
and the terms-of-trade results with respect to changes in taxes and subsidies.
15  
Systematic sensitivity analysis 
Often the model’s principal parameters are key to determining the simulation results. With 
a range of parameters, their effect on the key variables can be analysed (see Arndt and 
Pearson, 2000). This systematic sensitivity analysis resembles Monte Carlo analysis, where 
the value of variables giving rise to the uncertainty is selected at random and the reliability 
of the results in relation to the uncertainty is characterised using the mean values and stan-
                                                 
15On applications of the method, see also Vaittinen (2003). Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





dard deviations of the simulation results. In the method applied here, the discrete approxi-
mation for the distribution is defined to decrease the necessary steps in calculation.  In the 
section 6, we study the sensitivity of exports in energy commodities to elasticity of substi-




5  The costs of distorted energy markets  
The costs of the current tax and subsidy regime have been evaluated by simulating the total 
removal of output taxes, export and import taxes, as well as domestic subsidies and taxes 
in domestic use of energy and evaluating their relative importance. The extent of distor-
tions was described in Table 2.2. The model solves an efficient allocation of resources 
when all these distortions have been removed.  
The purpose of the exercise is not to champion the total removal of the distortions, but 
rather estimate their relative importance. We show which components in the system, as de-
scribed here, are most important for the dead-weight losses in the economy. We also look 
at their effects on industries and factor markets to see which industries and factors are fa-
voured by the current regime. 
 
 
The current distortions account in real terms for 6.2% of GDP.
16 Compared to the regional 
income the effect on GDP is smaller as the regional income increases by 9.1%. Apart from 
expenditures, the utility measure takes into account the increase in the price index for dis-
position of income by regional household, resulting in utility increase to be modest 4%. 
Distortions are transmitted to neighbouring countries, not only in price terms but also 
in real terms. We imagine that a more effective production structure would make the trad-
ing partners more effective as well, as more competitive imports replace some of current 
domestic production. Most of these efficiency costs have been drawn from other Former 
Soviet Union countries.  
Removing the current taxes and subsidies would substantially increase international 
trade between Russia and the rest of the world. Domestic taxes and subsidies can thus be 
interpreted as a trade barrier. As the current distortions apply just to Russia’s export indus-
tries, removing taxes and subsidies from these industries would substantially increase sup-
ply. For increasing exports, the demand for imported commodities would increase as well. 
We can interpret the subsidy policy to be a way of restricting international trade with 
outside countries and keeping the conditions of trade better for Russia. Increasing exports 
from Russia and supplies of gas and oil would certainly decrease the world market prices 
of energy commodities. Russia’s terms of trade would deteriorate. To evaluate the impor-
                                                 
16 All results, if not reported separately, are expressed as percentage changes from the base value. 
Table 5.1 Aggregate results of the total removal of distortions in Russian energy sector
EU EEA BALT RUSSIA XSU NAM ROW
Real gdp 0.1 0.2 0.1 6.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
Income 0.1 2.3 3.9 9.1 12.5 -0.2 -0.3
Utility 0.2 1.5 2.6 4.1 6.9 0.0 -0.1
Total exports 0.0 -2.5 -2.0 37.0 -0.3 0.2 0.1
Total imports 0.3 1.7 2.9 26.0 24.4 -0.1 -0.3
Terms of trade 0.4 2.0 2.0 -9.5 14.3 0.0 -0.3
Welfare in Mio USD 780.3 251.1 13.3 290.3 246.3 7.2 -457.1
Abbreviations: XSU (The rest of Former Soviet Union), NAM (USA and Canada), ROW (Rest of the World)BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





tance of different tax means, we have decomposed the GDP and the terms-of-trade results 
with respect to exogenous variables (see method describe above in 4.2). 
 




































For Russia, removal of all distortions contributes positively to GDP. The most important 
factors are subsidies for firms in the gas industry, which covers over half of the GDP in-
crease. Consumer subsidies for consumers are also important, while production and export 
taxes are of lesser importance. 
The simulation results show the importance of transit trade for the Baltic countries. Al-
though the effect of aggregate distortions is only 0.1% of GDP, the effect on income is 
magnified, mainly from export taxes. Removing such taxes would likely result in greater 
oil and gas transit trade through Baltic countries. In the terms-of-trade movement for Rus-
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prices, gas subsidies also play the leading role in keeping supply directed to domestic mar-
kets instead to foreign markets. 
 
















Welfare decomposition further reveals what was seen in the aggregate results. The total 
increase in welfare in Russia is positive, although dampened by the negative terms-of-trade 
effect. The other effects are seen mainly in Northern America (NAM), where relative yield 
from global investments increases as a result of removing distortions in Russia. The aggre-
gate welfare effect for Northern America, however, is tiny (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.2 presents the effects on Russian output and commodity prices from com-
pletely removing all taxes and subsidies. Removing distortions increases the prices of most 
manufactured products and decreases output. The hardest hit are the energy-intensive fuel 
industry, metal industry and chemicals. Services increase most, which is also the outcome 
from the demand structure of the model. The large increase in GDP results in a structural 
change in demand towards services.
17 
 
                                                 
17 The GTAP model’s demand system uses a non-homothetic constant elasticities in differences (CDE) struc-
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The effects on output and prices of energy commodities are more diverse. Oil production 
increases due to the removal of current output and export taxes. Removal of the current 
subsidy structure is behind the decreases in gas production and gas prices. Gas distribution 
appears to be quite sensitive in simulations results, and the results for their part are not 
very convincing.   
The results can be also interpreted by asking which industries the current regime fa-
vours. Clearly, the manufacturing industries and utilities have been supported by cheap 
gas. The current regime also appears to restrict the potential of oil industries. The effects 
on factor prices reveal that the current regime particularly favours owners of natural re-
sources at the expense of labour. The simulations decrease the rewards of natural resource 




6  The impact of price increases 
  on domestic gas and electricity 
As seen above, extensive implicit subsidies play a particularly significant role in distorting 
Russian energy markets. The prices of gas and electricity are regulated and the government 
sets the tariffs for them. Political realities dictate that price increases must take place in-
crementally. In 2004, the Duma plans to increase the price of natural gas 20% and the price 
of electricity 16%. If we include a plausible 10% inflation target, the relative prices of gas 
and electricity would rise 10% and 6%, respectively. Plans to double the gas price within a 
few years have been presented. 
We simulate the effects of these tariff hikes in energy with the previously set data 
where large subsidies are present for firms and consumers in gas and gas distribution and 
for consumers in electricity. More modified experiments are as follows: 
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The first three scenarios are similar except for assumptions related to the closure of the 
model. In Scenario 2, the price of oil is fixed to describe the regulated markets in oil. In 
Scenario 3 (EG-cb), we set the tax burden as fixed to simulate the situation where saved 
revenue would be allocated back to consumers. In Scenario 4, we have added tax increases 
recently suggested by the Duma to the price increases. The tax hikes include a 10% in-
crease in the oil and gas output tax, an increase in the gas export tax to 20% from the cur-
rent 10%. The last scenario serves not so much as a tax analysis, but as a means to eluci-
date the costs and benefits between taxes and removal of subsidies. 
 


















The aggregate results of the first experiment (EG) are presented in Figure 6.1. The price 
hikes raise GDP by 0.2%. The expenditures of households decrease by –0.36%, while the 
utility effect turns positive due to simultaneous decreases in the price index. Most of the 
effects happen in the external sector. Exports increase about 1.3% and imports decrease 
over 1%. Competitiveness in foreign markets deteriorates, and despite increasing exports, 
imports become less affordable. This is reflected in the declining terms of trade. 
The aggregate results for all countries from all the experiments appear in the Appendix 
Table 3. The aggregate effects for other countries remain modest. The assumption of fixing 
the oil price can be seen in the terms of trade effect. When increasing supply has no effect 
on export prices, the terms-of-trade deterioration is much smaller and the welfare effect is 
better. The assumption has no effect on GDP. The fixed budget assumption has a modest 
effect on total welfare through the household utility. This comes through the savings in the 
subsidies to regulated prices. 
In the final scenario (EG-tax), price increases are linked to tax increases and the effect 
on GDP is slightly negative. Unlike other cases, the terms of trade improve. The reason is 
Table 6.1 Scenario plan
Identification Gas tariff hike Electricity tariff hikeOther assumptions
Scenario 1 EG 10 % 6 %
Scenario 2 EG-o 10 % 6 % Price of oil fixed
Scenario 3 EG-cb 10 % 6 % Constant tax share (see 4.1.)
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obvious: raising taxes is a way to raise the market price of commodities. This last experi-
ment has implications for both domestic and international markets. Raising domestic prices 
decreases domestic distortions and redirects production towards exports. Increasing supply 
to international markets reduces the price of exportable commodities.  
The economic effects of increasing prices thus depend on whether there exist subsidies 
or not. Recall that we had subsidies in electricity use only for consumers, not for firms. 
While raising the regulated price to consumers increases efficiency in the economy, on the 
firm side, inefficiencies increase.
18 This dampens the positive effects from the price in-
creases. 
We now examine the industry-level results closely, focusing on the marginal transfer 
from domestic supply to international markets. The reported results are from Scenario 1 
(EG) in Table 6.2. 
 
 
Increasing regulated prices and reducing underlying subsidies decreases production of en-
ergy-intense commodities, gas and electricity. The other effects can be seen as secondary 
or adaptive effects. While output in energy-intensive industries decreases, however, it in-
creases in non-energy-intensive sectors. This is partly due to the general-equilibrium nature 
of the model, whereby all resources are in full use. 
The outcome in market prices reflects the demand and supply responses to the original 
shocks. Notably, oil output increases while its market price falls. The higher output is 
clearly destined for export; domestic demand decreases. This happens even though the 
price of oil and its markets in principle only adapt to external shocks. The same also hap-
pens in the gas market with price regulation. Domestic demand decreases and exports in-
creases clearly. We again ignore the analysis results for gas distribution. 
We have not analysed the results for consumer welfare here, because in energy com-
modities almost all direct production is exhausted by industry.
19 With regard to direct con-
                                                 
18 Technically, the price increases are implemented by setting prices fixed and respective tax variables en-
dogenous and giving shocks to these prices. 
19 Due to its basic assumption for the representative household, the standard GTAP model is less than ideal 
for analysing income distribution issues. Functional income distribution can be used to characterise income 
distribution. 
Table 6.2 Industry effects of price increase in gas and electricity
Output Market price Domestic sales Exports
COAL 0.0 -0.8 -0.6 23.2
OIL 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 2.0
GAS -0.5 -2.9 -2.9 5.9
GASDISTR -1.8 -0.1 -1.9 -1.1
ELECTRICITY -2.3 3.4 -1.4 -12.3
FUELIND -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 0.6
METAL -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.7
CHEMICALS -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.7
METAL IND 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 3.3
WOOD 0.6 -0.4 0.3 1.7
LIGHT 1.2 -0.6 0.9 4.0
CONSTRUCTION -1.5 -0.6 -1.5 2.4
FOOD 0.6 -0.6 0.5 2.8
AGRICULTURE 0.3 -0.4 0.2 1.8
TRADET 0.2 -0.7 0.0 2.0
SERVICE 0.3 -0.8 0.3 3.1Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 





sumption of the total output, the share is 10% for gas, 23% for electricity and 26% for the 
fuel industries. We can therefore interpret the consumer viewpoint by observing the devel-
opment in the price of electricity and fuels, which in Russia together account for less than 
3% of total expenditures in consumption. In the price of electricity, reforms produce the 
sharpest rise (3.4%). 
Table 6.3 presents the model results for the energy sector’s bilateral exports from Rus-
sia after reform. The increases in country-specific exports are substantial. The largest in-
creases are in gas going to Northern America (51.6%), the Rest of the World (23.7%) and 
the EU (16.9%). The effects on other energy products are also significant, especially in 
coal and oil. In the rows below the simulation results, we also report the results from the 
systematic sensitivity analysis (smaller font, see section 4.2 above). As mentioned, the 
Armington elasticities, which describe the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
imported commodities, have been changed in the database to 20 from the original 2.8. To 
study the sensitivity of this parameter, we let the elasticity vary from 5 to 35 in gas and oil. 
We assume a discrete triangular distribution to the parameter so that gas and oil elasticities 
correlate. The means and standard deviations of the systematic sensitivity analysis are re-
ported below the respective simulation result. Apparently exports other than gas are fairly 
insensitive to variations in elasticity. While exports from Russia to Russia seem very vola-
tile, but the results are meaningless, as there is no internal exports in Russia in the data-
base. There are larger deviations for gas exports (especially to NAM and ROW), but the 
results seem stable overall. 
 
Table 6.3.  Exports of energy commodities from Russia, including SSA results. 
  EU EEA  BALT  RUS  XSU  NAM  ROW 
COAL 27.0  22.4  18.7 8.5 16.4  34.0  27.4 
  26.9 0.1  22.4 0.0  18.8 0.2 8.5  0.1  16.5 0.1  33.8 0.2  27.3 0.1 
OIL  2.7 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 3.0 2.9 
  2.6 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.0  0.1  1.2 0.1 3.0 0.1 2.8 0.1 
GAS  16.9 4.8  2.7 1130.9  1.8 51.6 23.7 
  18.1 3.5 5.3 1.2 2.8  0.1  1653.5  1188
.1 
2.0 0.4  56.3  14.8  25.6 5.8 
GAS-
DISTR 
0.2 -4.9 2.3 558.3  -3.0 0.0  -2.4 
  0.1 1.1  -5.2 1.5 2.4 0.9 558.8  5.2  -3.1 1.1 0.0 1.2  -2.6 1.4 
ELEC -17.1  -17.6  -8.4 -4.1  -10.0  -17.4  -17.5 
  -17.1 0.1  -17.6 0.1  -8.5 0.1  -4.2  0.1  -10.1 0.2  -17.4 0.0  -17.5 0.1 
FUELIND  0.5 0.5 1.3 -0.6 0.9 0.6  0.6 
  0.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.3 0.0  -0.6  0.0  0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1 
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7  Conclusions  
The important economic role of Russia’s energy sector, both in absolute and relative terms, 
well justifies the examination of Russian energy markets in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Changes in the circumstances of the energy sector have repercussions for other sec-
tors of the economy and abroad. The foreign impact comes from the important role of Rus-
sian energy commodities in global trade. In particular, the vital role of Russian energy sup-
plies to the EU can only be expected to grow. 
The reform in the Russian energy sector is part of sectoral reforms in Russia and other 
transition economies. The main goals of the energy strategy accepted by the Russian Duma 
are to increase energy production and promote efficient energy use in Russia. Implementa-
tion of the strategy will move Russia closer to a market economy and harmonise its energy 
policies with other OECD economies (IEA 2003).  
In this study, we have assessed Russia’s energy markets and the initial reforms envi-
sioned by the government. To bring forth the global dimension of Russian energy markets 
and the impending reforms, a quantitative analysis was performed using a global general 
equilibrium trade model (GTAP). First, we analysed the current tax structure in the form of 
output and production taxes and export taxes. In addition to taxes, regulated prices of en-
ergy commodities well below their real costs and world market prices constitute an equally 
important feature of the current regime. To evaluate the effects of the proposed reforms, 
both parts have to be considered in estimating their actual market effects. 
We first estimated the size of the distortionary system. Our calculations show it corre-
sponds to 6.2% of GDP with subsidies making the greatest distorting contribution. The 
current tax structure, in contrast, works more to inhibit trade and exports, thus limiting the 
impact from any decrease in global prices of oil and gas.  
To provide practical policy insights, we analysed tariff increases for regulated prices of 
gas and electricity. Prices were raised 10% and 6%, respectively. The effect on GDP re-
mains modest, but positive. The results confirm the goals of the energy strategy by clearly 
shifting sales from domestic markets to exports. 
Plans to reform the market design through increased competition has been left out of 
our quantitative analysis. Increasing competition in the gas and oil markets, and in particu-
lar, promoting a competitive environment for pipeline capacity, would increase production 
for export and depress the world market price. Moreover, efficiency improvements, which 
are vital for the development of the Russian energy sector, could be included to the analy-
sis. These qualifications offer new possibilities to continue the work from here. 
Another area that we have not touched on at all is the Kyoto Protocol and its possible 
effects should Russia decide to ratify the agreement. It would have effect on global energy 
prices and change the effects of Russian domestic actions in the energy markets. The de-
mand impulse from increasing gas demand would raise the price of gas and certainly put 
pressure on Russian domestic prices.  
 Leena Kerkelä  Distortion costs and effects of price liberalisation 
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Appendix 1a.  Regional aggregation in the study. 
 Code  Region  Description 
1  EU  European  Union  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
2 EEA Eastern  European 
Economies 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Slovenia 
3  BALT  Baltic countries  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
4 RUS Russia  Russian  Federation 
5  XSU  Rest of Former Soviet 
Union 
Rest of Former Soviet Union 
6  NAM  North America  Canada, United States 
7  ROW  All other regions  Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, 
Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Mexico, Central America, Caribbean, Colom-
bia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, 
Rest of South America, Switzerland, Rest of European Free Trade Area, Cy-
prus, Turkey, Rest of Middle East, Morocco, Rest of North Africa, Botswana, 
Rest of South African Customs Union, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Other Southern Africa, Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Rest of World 
 
 
Appendix 1b. Commodity aggregation in the study. 
 Code  Sector  Description 
1 COAL    Coal 
1 ELEC    Electricity 
2 OIL    Oil 
3 GAS    Gas 
4 GASDISTR    Gas  manufacture,  distribution 
5  FUELIND    Petroleum, coal products 
6  METAL  Metals and minerals  Minerals nec; Mineral products nec; Ferrous metals; Metals 
nec 
7  CHEMICALS    Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
8  MECHE  Metal industry  Metal products; Motor vehicles and parts; Transport equip-
ment nec; Machinery and equipment nec 
9 WOOD  Wood  industry  Forestry; Wood products; Paper products and publishing. 
10  LIGHT  Light  manufacturing  Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather products; Electronic 
equipment; Manufactures nec 
11 CONSTRUCTION   Construction 
12  FOOD    Meat (cattle, sheep, goats, horse); Meat products nec; Vege-
table oils and fats; Dairy products; Processed rice; Sugar; 
Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products 
13  AGRICULTURE    Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables, fruit, nuts; 
Oil seeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; Plant-based fibers; Crops 
nec; Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw 
milk; Wool, silk-worm cocoons; Fishing 
14  TRADET  Trade and transport  Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport 
15  SERVICE    Water; Communication; Financial services nec; Insurance; 
Business services nec; Recreation and other services; Public 
Administration/Defence/Health/Education; Dwellings BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 








Appendix Table 3. Aggregate effects of different price increase scenarios
GDP EG EG-o EG-cb EG-tax
EU 00 0 0
EEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BALT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RUS 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
XSU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAM 00 0 0
ROW 00 0 0
Terms of trade EG EG-o EG-cb EG-tax
EU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EEA 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1
BALT 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2
RUS -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 0.3
XSU 0.5 0.1 0.5 -0.8
NAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ROW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Welfare EG EG-o EG-cb EG-tax
EU 781.1 773.9 758.2 -581.9
EEA 251.5 252.4 255.6 -272.0
BALT 13.3 13.1 13.6 -26.6
RUS 291.2 300.9 326.3 244.7
XSU 246.8 248.4 255.7 -414.7
NAM 7.1 9.4 -9.8 64.1
ROW -458.0 -463.2 -482.2 655.6
Appendix 2 Sectoral composition of GDP in the Russian Federation and EU
Value Added Total Production
Rus/GTAPRussia EU Rus/GTAPRussia 1 EU
1 Electricity 0 . 30 . 51 . 16 . 34 . 11 . 3
2 Oil 4 . 26 . 30 . 24 . 15 . 90 . 2
3 Gas 6 . 39 . 10 . 14 . 26 . 40 . 1
4 Gas Distribution 0 . 81 . 00 . 10 . 60 . 80 . 1
5 Fuel Industry 0 . 20 . 30 . 12 . 93 . 30 . 7
6 Raw metals and coal 5 . 25 . 72 . 36 . 8 73 . 7
7 Chemicals 1 . 41 . 63 . 12 . 42 . 4 5
8 Mechanical industry, automobi 4 . 74 . 27 . 55 . 75 . 2 1 0 . 8
9 Wood industries 1 . 51 . 42 . 61 . 81 . 73 . 4
10 Light manufacturing 2 . 42 . 14 . 32 . 72 . 4 6
11 Construction 98 . 55 . 78 . 07 . 96 . 7
12 Food industries 3 . 83 . 53 . 36 . 4 65 . 4
13 Agriculture 9 . 98 . 92 . 19 . 38 . 9 2
14 Trade and transport 15.1 14.5 18.3 13.1 13 16.6
15 Services 35.3 32.2 49.1 25.6 25 38.1
Total 100.1 100.0 100.0 99.9 100 100
Energy intensity 11.8 17.3 1.7 15.2 20.5 2.4
Source: GTAP Database 5.4. For 1997 and author's calculationsBOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
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